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简氏:中国前进
China marches forward
作者:《环球展望》编译 来源:简氏官方网站 更新时间:2007-5-7 【字体:

13547201_2006081709063843553100.jpg
中国歼-10 02号机地面展示

    作者:Timothy Hu

    革新中国人民解放军(PLA)是转变到更高的调整诸如它获得新一代本国-发展武器交付和提升发展尖端非对称技术用来挫败更先进的敌手。

    连同继续改良进口的俄国武器,改进训练和提高专业化程度一起,中国现在坚定的在成为一个可靠的地区军事力量道路上。

    一批新的本国武器平台已经在去年展示领先目前PLA军械库的最少一代。这包括第四代F-10多任务战斗机,WS-10涡扇发动机和一次在1月未经宣布的试验一个弹道反卫星武器系统摧毁了在超过805公里高度的空间中的一颗卫星。

    这些证明中国高科技军事的威力,尤其反卫星打击,已经激发国际不安和促使呼吁中国对于它的军事活动和意图更大的透明度。

    然而,正如它重整军备推动获得相当大的进步,PLA正发展去符合一个增长的军队职责去保护扩展全球的世界第四大经济体的利益。一个显著不足是缺少远距离海军能力去保护中国海路交通,运输超过国家外部贸易的80%。

    这是一个改造国防编制的巨大的任务,更确切地说更适于作战一个越战-时代冲突胜于21世纪交战手段,当他们获得年度国防开支双位数增加时候,PLA首长已经去选择。空军,海军和战略导弹力量是在装备筹备优先次序队列前面,期间曾经占优势的地面部队延迟适当在后面。

    在3月PLA的报酬包括在2007年官方的国防预算公告一个有力的17.8%增加,在过去10年是与上年同期数字相比最高的增加。军方官员指出主要的今年急剧上涨是包括在2006年后半年中实现一个60%上涨的薪金,生活费补助金和津贴。这些人员支出将会耗去将近60%的今年预算增长。

    虽然外国专家关心当众公布USD450亿美元预算表现三分之一和三分之二之间的中国真实国防开支,因为它不包括在武器研究和发展或国外武器购买时的开支,增加大小仍然是领导层支持和国家慷慨的一个好晴雨表。而且,当这个最新国防预算是已经在2006年启动运行到2010年第11个五年国防计划的第二年分期拨款,这也许是PLA可能连续享有这个固定比率预算增长直到这十年结束的一个信号。

    一些资深的中国国防官员辩论军费将提高从现有水平的1.5%到国内生产总值2%和3%之间,将和先进西方经济比较。然而,在目前这是不太可能的因为领导层保持坚定的集中在国家经济发展上。

    PLA首脑需求在紧迫和高价去保持一个审慎的平衡需要更新一个庞大的陈旧武器目录同一个更慎重的长期步骤朝向转变武装力量到一个信息-时代成套装备。在2006年底发布的最新中国国防白皮书概略说明一个三阶段国防发展战略延伸到这个世纪中期。

    第一个近-期阶段的目标是为国家军事状况“2010年之前铺设一个坚固基础”,PLA选择性的将会使用新一代舰艇,航空和导弹硬件替换仅仅有限比例它现有军械库。剩余的详细目录将会升级便宜的通过增加传感器,导航定位系统,红外探测器,计算机和其它设备那将会允许它们,理论上至少,去实施网络-激活操作。

image
解放军三种型号导弹,从近到远分别是DF-21、DF-15和DF-11

    近-期间现代化的中心目标是要获得能力去允许PLA实施一个快速和决定性胜利对抗台湾地区同时阻止美国军事干预。PLA集中获得精确打击资产间接表明它首选军事战略将成为一个'斩首'策略会中立台湾地区平民和军事指挥及控制设备和除关键军事能力之外至关重要的基础设施与通信设施。这个进攻能力中心环节是PLA有力的导弹力量。PLA已经从1990年中期以后面对台湾地区专注于一个预定的积累它的短程弹道导弹力量。

    附原文供对照参考:

China marches forward
By Timothy Hu

The regeneration of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is shifting into higher gear as it takes delivery of a new generation of home-grown arms and steps up the development of sophisticated asymmetric technologies designed to thwart more advanced adversaries.

Along with the continuing importation of Russian weapons, improved training and rising levels of professionalism, China is now firmly on track to become a credible regional military power.

An array of new indigenous weapon platforms has been unveiled in the past year that is at least a generation ahead of the PLA's existing arsenal. This includes the fourth-generation F-10 multirole combat aircraft, the WS-10 turbofan engine and a ballistic anti-satellite weapon system that destroyed a satellite at an altitude of more than 805 km in space in an unannounced test in January.

These demonstrations of Chinese high-tech military prowess, especially the anti-satellite hit, have sparked international unease and prompted calls for greater Chinese transparency towards its military activities and intentions.

However, even as its rearmament drive makes considerable progress, the PLA is being stretched to meet a growing array of responsibilities to safeguard the broadening global interests of the world's fourth largest economy. One glaring deficiency is a lack of long-range naval capabilities to secure China's sea lanes of communications, which carry more than 80 per cent of the country's external commerce.

This enormous task of remaking a defence establishment that is still more suited to fighting a Vietnam War-era conflict than a 21st century engagement means that PLA chiefs have to be selective even as they reap double-digit increases in annual defence spending. The air force, navy and strategic missile forces are at the front of the queue in equipment funding priorities, while the once dominant ground forces lag well behind.

The PLA was rewarded with a hefty 17.8 per cent increase in the 2007 official defence budget announced in March, which is one of the highest year-on-year increases in the past decade. Military officials point out that a major reason for this year's sharp jump is to cover a 60 per cent rise in salaries, cost of living subsidies and pensions implemented in the second half of 2006. These personnel outlays will swallow up nearly 60 per cent of this year's budget increase.

While outside experts regard the publicly disclosed budget of USD45 billion as representing between a third and two thirds of actual Chinese defence spending, as it does not include expenditure on weapon research and development or foreign arms purchases, the size of the increase is nonetheless a good barometer of leadership support and the largesse of the state. Moreover, as this latest defence budget is the second-year instalment of the 11th five-year defence programme that started in 2006 and runs to 2010, this could be a signal that the PLA may continue to enjoy this robust rate of budgetary growth until the end of this decade.

Some senior Chinese defence officials argue that military outlays should be lifted from the current level of 1.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product to between two and three per cent, which would be comparable to advanced Western economies. However, this is unlikely in the near term as the leadership's priorities remain firmly focused on the country's economic development.

PLA chiefs are seeking to maintain a careful balance between the urgent and expensive near-term demands of recapitalising a vast inventory of outdated weapons with a more measured long-term approach towards transforming the armed forces into an information-age outfit. The latest Chinese defence white paper issued at the end of 2006 outlines a three-stage defence development strategy that extends to the middle of this century.

The goal of the first near-term phase is to "lay a solid foundation by 2010" for the country's military posture, in which the PLA will selectively replace only a limited proportion of its existing arsenal with new-generation naval, aviation and missile hardware. The remaining inventory will be upgraded cheaply through the addition of sensors, navigational positioning systems, infrared detectors, computers and other devices that will allow them, in theory at least, to conduct network-enabled operations.

The central objective of this near-term modernisation is to acquire the capabilities to allow the PLA to execute a quick and decisive victory against Taiwan while deterring US military intervention. The PLA's concentrated acquisition of precision strike assets suggests that its preferred military strategy would be a 'decapitation' strategy that would neutralise Taiwan's civilian and military command-and-control apparatuses and vital infrastructure and communication facilities in addition to key military capabilities. The centrepiece of this offensive capability is the PLA's potent missile force. The PLA has been engaged in a concerted buildup of its short-range ballistic missile force facing Taiwan since the mid-1990s.

787 of 5,176 words
© 2007 Jane's Information Group
[End of non-subscriber extract]

文章录入:军闻    责任编辑:《环球展望》 
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